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Construction and Constraint:
Discussion of Living Originalism
Lawrence B. Solum*
Introduction: Living Originalism and the problem of
constraint
Jack Balkin's Living Originalism1 raises many important questions about con-
temporary constitutional theory. Can and should liberals and progressives em-
brace originalism? Can the New Deal expansion of national legislative power be
given originalist foundations? Is there a plausible originalist case for a right to
reproductive autonomy and hence for the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade?2 Is
the fact of theoretical disagreement among originalists evidence for the thesis
that the originalist project is in disarray?
On important issue raised by Balkin's version of originalism is connected
with debates about the role of courts and judges in constitutional adjudication.
The US Supreme Court has the final say on constitutional questions. The US
Constitution contains a variety of broadly worded abstract provisions, including
the First Amendment recognition of a right of "freedom of speech" and Article
Two's vesting of "executive power" in the President. Living constitutionalism-
the view that the meaning of the Constitution should adapt to changing cir-
cumstances and values-seems to provide the Justices with unconstrained
power to shape constitutional law in the image of their personal views about
policy and morality. Unlike the Congress and the President, the Supreme
Court is only weakly constrained by democratic elections, separation of
powers, and checks and balances. Supreme Court Justices have life terms.
The decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions cannot be
vetoed by the President or modified by ordinary legislation. Of course some
checks are available. The Constitution can be amended. Justices can be im-
peached. In theory, the number of Justices can be expanded through ordinary
legislation. More controversially, Congress may have the power to constrain the
court by modifying its jurisdiction. These checks provide some constraint, but
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'JACK BAUGIN, UvnING ORIGINAUSM (2011).2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
O The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions,
please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
1Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies
critics of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence worry about their sufficiency.
Let us call the worry articulated by these critics "the problem of constraint."
Early versions of constitutional originalism addressed the problem of con-
straint. The Supreme Court could bind itself. Justices would decide constitu-
tional cases in accord with the original meaning of the constitutional text or the
original intentions of the framers. Constrained by original meaning, the Justices
would no longer be free to impose their own views about controversial issues in
the guise of constitutional interpretation.
But early versions of originalism were criticized. Indeed, the term "origin-
alism" was coined by Paul Brest in an article entitled The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding.3 Brest and others raised a host of objections to the
idea that the framer's intentions could provide a determine guide for the reso-
lution of constitutional controversies. The nascent originalist camp responded
to the criticisms in various ways, but a crucial move occurred in 1986, when
Justice Scalia gave a speech exhorting originalists to "change the label from the
Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning."4 The phrase
"original public meaning" entered contemporary theoretical debates through
the work of Gary Lawson,5 and subsequently in work by Steven Calabresi and
Sai Prakash.6 More work on what came to be called "the New Originalism" or
"Original Public Meaning Originalism" was done by Randy Barnett7 and Keith
Whittington. 8 At this stage in the evolution of originalist constitutional theory,
the theory was associated with scholars and judges who could be characterized
as conservative or libertarian. Living constitutionalists and the critics of origin-
alism tended to be liberal or progressive.
This very compressed story of the evolution of originalist theory9 sets the stage
for Jack Balkin's Living Orignalism. Balkin advocates "framework originalism"-
a form of originalism that attempts to reconcile fidelity to the original meaning
of the Constitution with the very doctrines of constitutional law that gave rise to
conservative worries about the problem of constraint. Living Originalism endorses
the outcomes of New Deal cases that expand federal power and Warren and
Burger Court cases that recognize unenumerated rights to privacy and repro-
ductive autonomy. Does Balkin have a solution to the problem of constraint? Or
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 234 (1980).
4 Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (14
June 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101 at 106 (US Department of Justice ed.,
1987).
s See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859 at 875 (1992).
6 See Steven G. Calabresi & Sailrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J.
541 at 553 (1994).
7 See RANDY E. BARNEr, RESTORING THE LoST CONSTITUTION (2004).
8 See KErri E. WHrrrINGToN, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); KErrH E. WHITTINGTON,
CoNsmrrTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999).
9 For a less compressed version of the story, see Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of
Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINAUSM: THEORIES OF CoNSTTUToNAL
INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) [hereinafter, Solum, What is
Originalism?].
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is Living Originalism an attempt to reformulate originalist theory in a way that
legitimizes a relative unconstrained practice of judicial review?
Some critics of contemporary originalist theory argue that efforts like Balkin's
are inconsistent with the spirit of the originalist project. Consider the following
passage from an essay by Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould:
Recall that originalism grew out of an understandable desire to cabin the interpretive
discretion of unrepresentative, unaccountable judges who, under the guise of "inter-
preting" the counter-majoritarian Constitution, were all too often trumping the
democratic process by superimposing their own social policy choices on the major-
itarian political process. The means for restraining modem judicial review contem-
plated by originalist theory was to confine the interpretive options open to modern
judges to the understandings of those alive at the time of the framing and ratification
of the relevant constitutional provision. Yet, contrary to this asserted goal, the origin-
alist construction school openly concedes the widespread impossibility of successfully
performing the archaeological and translational task that is the sine qua non of true
originalist analysis. It replaces it with an indeterminate mode of "construction" that
permits the very results that originalism was designed to avoid-namely, the unre-
strained judicial trumping of democratically authorized decision making and the im-
plementation of textual understandings of which those alive at the time of ratification
would have been totally unaware. This may well be an appropriate means of consti-
tutional construction for those of us who have long categorically rejected the entire
originalist endeavor as hopeless and often manipulative. But it is surely Orwellian to
describe this theory as "originalist" in any meaningful sense of that term.' 0
The remainder of this essay tackles these questions, beginning in section "The
core of originalist constitutional theory", which examines the theoretical struc-
ture of the problem of constraint in the context of originalist theory. Section
"The interpretation-construction distinction" examines Balkin's approach to
the problem of constraint in two ways, first by examining the theoretical structure
of framework originalism and second by looking closely at Balkin's discussion of
national legislative power. Section "The mechanisms of constraint" concludes.
Our aim at this stage is to understand the problem of constraint in the
context of originalist constitutional theory. We can begin with a brief investi-
gation of originalism itself.
The core of originalist constitutional theory
Originalism is a family of theories. We have already seen two prominent mem-
bers of the family, "original intentions originalism" and "original public
'o Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic
Dilemma: Proposing a "Controlled Activism" Alternative, 64 FLA. L REv. 1485, 1509 (2012). Redish and Arnould
do not provide a precise understanding of their notion of idea of construction, but they are not using the term in
the same way that it is articulated by contemporary originalist theory. See Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONsT. ComMamr. 95 (2010).
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meaning originalism," but there are others, including a version of originalism
that focuses on the understandings of the ratifiers and a variant of
public-meaning originalism that emphasizes the original methods of constitu-
tional interpretation." For our purposes, the important task is to identify the
core ideas that these closely related versions of originalism share.
We can begin with a very basic distinction from general legal theory-the
distinction between communicative content and legal content. This distinction
could be stated using different language-we could differentiate between the
"meaning of the constitutional text" and the "doctrines of constitutional law."
The basic idea of the distinction is very simple. Legal texts have what we might
call "linguistic meaning"-the meaning of the words and phrases in context.
We can call this meaning the "communicative content" of the text. The com-
municative content of a text predates its adoption; indeed, we need to figure
out what a legal text means in order to decide whether we should adopt it. But
once a legal text is adopted, it gives rise to legal rules and these rules are not
necessarily identical to the communicative content of the text. The constitution
provides many examples of this distinction. The communicative content of the
first amendment freedom of speech is roughly the linguistic meaning of these
words: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." The
linguistic meaning is quite sparse-containing only three basic elements: (i) a
reference to the United States Congress; (ii) the idea of a prohibited abridge-
ment; and (iii) the notion of "the freedom of speech." But the content of the
associated doctrines of constitutional law is very rich indeed, including notions
such as prior restraint, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions,
and doctrines elaborating specific rules applying to public fora, the Internet,
and even billboards. These doctrines of constitutional law provide the "legal
content" of the First Amendment freedom of speech. It is clear that the two
are not identical: the linguistic meaning of the words does not contain the
elaborate structure of free-speech doctrine.
The distinction between communicative content and legal content gives us a
vocabulary for a relatively precise articulation of the core of the family of
originalist constitutional theories. The core consists of two principles, which
we can call "the fixation thesis" and "the constraint principle."
The fixation thesis can be stated as follows:
The communicative content of the constitution (the linguistic meaning of the words
in context) is fixed at the time each constitutional provision is framed and ratified.
This is a simple idea and it applies very generally to oral and written commu-
nication. It has two constituent elements, which we can call the "semantic
component" and the "contextual component." The semantic component is
" John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the
Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 751 (2009) [hereinafter Original Methods Originalism].
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based on the fact that conventional semantic meanings and the regularities we
sometimes call rules of syntax and grammar are time bound:
The semantic content of constitutional meaning is fixed by linguistic practices at the
time each constitutional provision is framed and ratified.
The semantic component of the fixation thesis is illustrated by the now-familiar
example of the phrase "domestic violence" in Article IV of the US
Constitution. Today, this phrase is mostly used to refer to violence within a
family or household-spousal abuse, child abuse, and elder abuse, for example.
But at the time Article IV was written, "domestic Violence" referred to riots,
rebellions, and other forms of harmful physical force within the territory of a
political unit-in context, within the boundaries of a state.12 The phrase do-
mestic violence illustrates the well-known phenomenon of linguistic drift-the
gradual change of linguistic meanings over time.' 3
The second aspect of the fixation thesis goes to the contribution of context
to communicative content. The context in which a text is communicated to a
reader is fixed in time. This contextual component of the fixation thesis can be
stated as follows:
The publicly available context of constitutional communication is fixed at the time
the text was framed and ratified.
In the case of the various provisions of the US Constitution, the context is
fixed at the time each provision was framed and rectified, but it includes the
entire publicly shared context. For example, the context in which the
Constitution of 1789 was framed and ratified includes the events surrounding
the Philadelphia Convention, but it also includes experience under the Articles
of Confederation, the American Revolution, and likely important events in
English constitutional history (e.g., Magna Carta). Amendments to the
Constitution are proposed and ratified at a particular time, but the relevant
context shared by drafters, the participants in proposal and ratification, and the
public may include events from past years or decades.' 4
The fixation thesis is the first element of the core of contemporary origi-
nalism. The second element is the constraint principle. The idea of the con-
straint principle is simple and highly intuitive:
The communicative content of the constitutional text should constrain the content of
constitutional doctrine.
12 See Balkin, supra note I at 37. For a contrary, clever, and utterly implausible argument to the contrary, see
Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in "New Originalist" Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONsr. L Q. 129, 133-35
(2009).13 SOL STEINMEn, SEMAN-nc ANncs: How AND WHY WoRDs CHANGE MEANING (2008).
14 The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution is a special case; it was proposed by Congress on 25
September 1789, but ratification did not occur until 7 May 1992. See Certification of Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States Relating to Compensation of Members of Congress, 57 Fed. Reg. 21, 187-
88 (19 May 1992).
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The constraint principle expresses the originalist solution to the problem of
constraint. Even living constitutionalists are likely to believe that the original
meaning of the constitutional text should play some role in constitutional in-
terpretation and construction. What makes the originalist family of constitu-
tional theories distinctive is commitment to the constraint principle.
The statement of the constraint principle upon which all or almost all ori-
ginalist theories converge is abstract and vague. Some originalists may endorse
versions of the principle that provide very strong constraint; others may accept
weaker forms of constraint. We can illustrate variations in the constraint prin-
ciple by articulating both a minimalist and a maximalist version.
At a minimum, originalists could believe that the legal content of constitu-
tional doctrine must satisfy two requirements. First, constitutional doctrine
may not be inconsistent with the linguistic meaning of the text in context.
Second, the rules of constitutional law must include rules that fairly capture
the communicative content of all of the portions of the text that are in force
(not repealed). This minimalist version of the constraint principle would allow
for constitutional doctrine that supplements the text in various ways-imple-
menting rules (like the prior restraint doctrine in free-speech doctrine) are
allowed.
At the maximum, originalists could believe that the legal content of consti-
tutional doctrine must be identical to the linguistic meaning of the text in
context. For the maximalist, each and every rule of constitutional law should
be fairly traceable to the communicative content of the text. The doctrine of
prior restraint would therefore be illegitimate unless was part of the semantic
meaning of "freedom of speech" or communicated by First Amendment in
context-by implication, implicature, impliciture, or some other form of con-
textual enrichment of semantic content.
The fixation thesis and the constraint principle constitute the core of contem-
porary originalist thought. These are the ideas upon which almost all origin-
alists agree. Is framework originalist, the theory that Balkin advances in Living
Originalism, consistent with the core? Balkin endorses the fixation thesis expli-
citly: "All forms of originalism claim that something is fixed in place at the
time of adoption, that it cannot be altered except through amendment, that it
matters for correct interpretation."15 Similarly, framework originalism endorses
a minimalist version of the constraint principle (and rejects a maximalist ver-
sion associated with the theory that Balkin calls "skyscraper originalism."):
In skyscraper originalism, judges are constrained when they apply the original con-
stitutional bargain using the proper methodology for ascertaining it; when they fail to
do this, they are unconstrained and are simply imposing their own beliefs. Thus
skyscraper originalism views following correct interpretive methodology as the central
15 JACK M. BAUGN, CoNmrurioNAL REDEMPTON: POUmCAL FArmH IN AN UNJUST WouiD 228 (2011) [here-
inafter Constinatonal Redemption].
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constraint of judges. Framework originalism also requires that judges apply the
CQnstitution's original meaning. But it assumes that this will not be sufficient to
decide a wised range of controversies so judges will have to engage in considerable
constitutional construction as well as the elaboration and application of previous
constructions. Hence, fidelity to original meaning cannot constrain judicial behavior
all by itself.' 6
Thus, Balkin endorses both the fixation thesis and a version of the constraint
principle. It follows that framework originalism is a member of the originalist
family.
The interpretation-construction distinction
The core of contemporary originalism is defined by the fixation thesis and the
constraint principle-the ideas upon which almost all contemporary originalists
agree. Another important idea is more controversial-the interpretation-con-
struction distinction.17 This distinction marks the difference between two dif-
ferent moments or activities. The first activity is the discovery of the
communicative content (or linguistic meaning in context) of a legal utterance:
I will use the term interpretation to name this activity. The second activity is the
determination of the legal content and legal effect produced by a legal text: I
will use the term construction to name this second and distinct activity. The
interpretation-construction is an old one in American legal theory,1s and it has
been much discussed recently in constitutional theory, but the words "inter-
pretation" and "construction" are also used in a broader sense to refer to both
activities (discovering meaning and determining legal effect). Nothing hangs on
the terminology, since we could describe the interpretation-construction dis-
tinction using other words.
We can rationally reconstruct interpretation and construction as two mo-
ments in a larger activity, which we can call "constitutional practice." We
could reconstruct this practice as involving two steps: first, we ascertain the
communicative content of the constitutional text (interpretation), and second,
we determine the legal effect of the text (construction). In judicial constitu-
tional practice, this second step frequently involves "constitutional doctrine"-
elaborations of the legal content associated with the text. This rational recon-
struction pictures interpretation and construction as two distinct steps per-
formed in sequential order, but in actual constitutional practice, the two
steps may be not be clearly distinguished and the sequence of reasoning may
16 Balkin, supra note I at 22.
17 Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CoNsT. COMmEnr. 95 (2010).
I" FRAcis LmER, LEGAL AND PourlCAL HERmENEurncs (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Win. S.
Hein & Co. 1970) (1839). For the Google Books version, see http://books.google.com/books?id=_ww
AAAAAYAAJ&dq=lieber+interpretation+construction&source=gbs.naviinkss.
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go from construction to interpretation and then back to construction (or in any
other order).
How is the interpretation-construction related to the problem of constraint?
In Living Originalism, Balkin explicitly endorses the interpretation-construction
distinction and notes the important connection of construction to constraint.
Framework originalism also requires that judges apply the Constitution's original
meaning. But it assumes that this will not be sufficient to decide a wised range of
controversies so judges will have to engage in considerable constitutional construction
as well as the elaboration and application of previous constructions. Hence, fidelity to
original meaning cannot constrain judicial behavior all by itself.' 9
The claim that interpretation does not suffice to constraint constitutional prac-
tice is controversial among originalists.
Why is constitutional construction controversial? Constitutional practice
necessarily involves both interpretation and construction. Construction
(as defined) just is the activity of determining the effect to be given to the
constitutional text. This happens whenever a constitutional case is decided or
officials act on the basis of their constitutional understandings. The idea of
constitutional construction becomes controversial when we introduce the claim
that the communicative content of the constitutional text underdetermines the
legal content of constitutional doctrine.
Why do some originalists (including Jack Balkin) believe that the linguistic
meaning of the constitution does not answer all the questions that arise in
constitutional practice? One answer to this question is provided by examples.
Consider the free-speech clause (discussed above). Free-speech cases arise in
particular circumstances; claims arise in the context of government regulations
of campaign finance, billboards, commercial advertising, subversive speech,
and so on. To many originalists, it seems obvious that the language of the
First Amendment does not dictate the content of the constitutional doctrines
required to resolve these cases. A second answer to the question provides a
typology of the mechanisms of underdetermination. Consider four mechan-
isms: (i) irreducible ambiguity, (ii) vagueness or open texture, (iii) gaps or
incompleteness, and (iv) contradictions or inconsistencies.
Ambiguity occurs when a legal text can have more than one meaning. In
many cases, ambiguity can be resolved by reference to context, but there may
be cases when ambiguity is irreducible. For example, the drafters of a legal text
might introduce deliberate ambiguity in order to "paper over" a failure to agree
on substance, "kicking the can down the road." If the ambiguity is truly irre-
ducible, then the application of the text to a problem implicating the ambiguity
cannot be resolved by interpretation-the ambiguous meaning underdeter-
mines resolution of the problem.
19 Balldn, supra note I at 22.
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Vagueness arises when a term or expression involves borderline cases. For
example, the Constitution of the USA uses the phrases "legislative power,"
"executive power," and "judicial power." It may be the case that the linguistic
meaning of these phrases does not create sharp boundaries and bright lines:
there may be borderline cases such that a particular action might be either
legislative or executive in nature. (Think about an executive order creating a
general practice not to deport undocumented persons who entered the country
as children and who are currently enrolled as students.) Vague texts under-
determine the outcome of cases in the penumbra or on the borderline. Similar
points can be made about gaps and contradictions. In some possible cases, an
incomplete or inconsistent legal text will not provide communicative content
sufficient to resolve a particular legal problem within the domain governed by
the text.
Balkin's theory, framework originalism, is based on the assumption that the
communicative content of legal texts underdetermines constitutional practice.
For Balkin, much of the work of constitutional practice occurs in what we can
call "the construction zone"-the area in which the linguistic meaning of the
text is insufficient to provide determinate answers to constitutional questions.
Constitutional construction can liquidate irreducible ambiguities, precisify
vagueness, fill in gaps, and resolve contradictions.
The mechanisms of constraint
We are investigating the relationship between originalism in general (and Jack
Balkin's framework originalism in particular) and the problem of constraint.
Originalism solves the problem of constraint by adopting the fixation thesis and
the constraint principle, but different forms of originalism vary outside of this
core.
We can investigate the ways in which different forms of originalism tackle the
problem of constraint by looking at their varying accounts of interpretation and
construction. In the realm of interpretation, different originalist theories pro-
vide different accounts of the manner in which communicative content is fixed.
In realm of construction, different originalist theories provide different versions
of the constraint principle and different implementations of the idea of con-
straint. For our purposes, we can think of these different versions of originalism
as providing different mechanisms of constraint.
Constraint in interpretation
Interpretation is the activity that recovers the communicative content of the
constitutional text. Different versions of originalism offer different theories of
communicative content. Of course, a full discussion of these theories would be
quite lengthy, but we can offer a sketch of some of the different accounts.
25
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Consider first the distinction between versions of originalism that focus on
the original intentions of the framers, the original understandings of the rati-
fiers, and the original public meaning of the text. All three versions accept the
fixation thesis, varying only slightly as to the time of fixation. But these three
versions of originalism differ more substantially in their account of the mech-
anism by which fixation occurs.
Consider first original intentions originalism. Let us adopt a very substantial
simplification of intentionalism and assume that this version of originalism can
be formulated as follows:
Original intentions originalism-the communicative content of the constitutional text is
fixed by the communicative intentions of the framers at the time each provision was
authored.
By way of contrast, we could formulate original understandings originalism in
this way:
Original understandings originalism-the communicative content of constitutional text
is fixed by the meaning grasped by participants in the ratification process at the time
each provision was ratified.
And finally, public meaning originalism:
Original public meaning originalism-the communicative content of the constitutional
text is fixed by the meaning of the constitutional grasped by competent speakers of
American English at the time each provision was framed and ratified.
These three formulations involve substantially different accounts of the way
that meaning is fixed, but these differences should not be exaggerated. In
theory, it is possible that, with respect to a particular constitutional clause,
the framers intended one meaning, the ratifiers grasped a second meaning,
and the public understood the provision in yet a third way. In practice, framers
(as competent speakers of English) are aware of the possibilities of miscom-
munication. This means they have good reason to employ words in their stand-
ard senses (conventional semantic meanings) and to hew close to standard
forms of syntax and grammar. As a consequence, all three theories are likely
to focus on the conventional semantic meaning of the constitutional text as the
likely (or presumptive) meaning. We can call the conventional semantic mean-
ing of the words and phrases as combined by syntax and grammar the "se-
mantic content" of the text.
Almost all originalists are likely to accept the notion that at least part of the
meaning of the constitutional text is provided by its semantic content. But
originalists may differ with respect to the role that context plays in enhancing
on enriching that semantic content. We are now discussing the aspect of mean-
ing that philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics calls "pragmatics."
For our purposes, let us call the acontextual meaning of a text its "semantic
26
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meaning": this idea roughly corresponds to what lawyers sometimes call "literal
meaning." We can call the process by which context adds to semantic meaning
"contextual enrichment." (In the philosophy of language and theoretical lin-
guistics, the phrase "pragmatic enrichment" is used to name this concept, but
for the purposes of legal theory the more familiar word "contextual" better
communicates the idea.) The full communicative content of the text is the
contextually enriched communicative content.
A full description of the various forms of contextual enrichment would re-
quire us to survey and categorize the various ways in which context adds to
semantic content. One familiar example is the use of indexicals: "this," "here,"
"now," and pronouns like "I" or "you" are indexicals, their meaning depends
on the context in which they are used. Acontextually, the sentence "I am
writing this article" could refer to any article, but as used by me (Solum) on
this occasion (in this essay in the ferusalem Review of Legal Studies) it refers to a
particular person and a particular text. Another example of the role of context
is the liquidation of ambiguity: the Constitution uses the word "Senate" and
particular passages in the Constitution, if read acontextually, are ambiguous as
between the Roman Senate, the Senate of University College, London, and the
Senate of the USA. In context, the ambiguity disappears and it becomes clear
that all of the uses of "Senate" in Article One of the US Constitution refer to
the last of the three entities with the name "Senate." Additional forms of
pragmatic enrichment are called implicature and impliciture: a text can mean
more than it says. For example, the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution
says, "The enumeration of certain rights in this constitution shall be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." This provision does state
that there are any actual rights retained by the people; it is logically consistent
with the nonexistence of such rights. But many careful readers of the Ninth
Amendment believe that it makes no practical sense unless it is read as requir-
ing the recognition of at least some unenumerated rights that are retained by
the people: it would make no sense to prohibit the denying or disparaging of
such rights if they did not exist.
Some originalists may believe that the communicative content of the
Constitution should be limited to its semantic content. Because semantic con-
tent is relatively sparse, this limitation on content results in less constraint. The
richer the communicative content, the more the constitution says, and there-
fore the more constraint it provides-relative to any particular articulation of
the constraint principle. Ryan Williams provides an example of an originalist
who argues for a limited role for contextual enrichment of semantic content.
After recognizing the legitimacy of constitutional implication, Williams suggests
the following criterion:
[If the implied content is not semantically encoded in the text, interpreters should
inquire whether a reasonable member of the ratifying public at the time of enactment
27
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would have recognized the implied content as following obviously and noncontrover-
sially from the choice of the particular language used in the provision and the relevant
background context.20
Williams allows for contextual enrichment of semantic content, but imposes a
significant limitation by excluding any actual contextual enrichment that is
nonobvious or controversial.
Balkin does not take an explicit stand on contextual enrichment. Balkin is
explicit that that by "original meaning" her refers to "the semantic content of
the words in the clause." 2 1 To the extent that framework originalism limits
original meaning to semantic content and excludes contextual enrichment, it
dramatically reduces the constraint imposed by original meaning.
One more point about interpretation as a mechanism of constraint.
Originalists and critics of originalism sometimes discuss "original expected
applications." The phrase "original applications" or "original expected appli-
cations" seems to originate with Jack Balkin, 22 but Mark Greenberg and Harry
Litman articulated a similar distinction between "original meaning" and "ori-
ginal practices" in their important 1998 article, The Meaning of Original
Meaning.2 The distinction is a simple one. The linguistic meaning of a text
is one thing, and expectations about the application of that meaning to future
cases are a different thing.
Balkin argues against the use of "original expected applications" as direct
determinants of original meaning.24 His argument is that expectations and
meaning are conceptually distinct and hence that direct reliance on expected
applications conflates application with meaning:
Originalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way
it was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not following what the
words mean and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law. But they have
tended to conflate two different ideas-the expected application of constitutional
texts, which is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. Indeed, many
originalists who claim to be interested only in original meaning, like Justice Antonin
Scalia, have encouraged this conflation of original meaning and original expected
application in their practices of argument. 25
Balkin may well be right to claim that some originalists conflate original mean-
ing with expected applications, but to the extent that expectations are
excluded, the degree of constraint is diminished.
20 Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, Ill COLUM. L. REv. 498, 544 (2011).
2' Balkin, supra note I at 13.
22 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONS. COMMETrr. 291, 293 (2007) [hereinafter
Abortion and Original Meaning].
23 Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEo. L J. 569 (1998).
24 Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CoNsT. CoMMENT. 427, 446 (2007).
2s Balkin, supra note 22 at 292-93.
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The point of this section has been to provide an account of the various ways
in which different originalist theories of interpretation (distinguished from con-
struction) provide constraint. As a practical matter, most originalist theories
converge on conventional semantic meaning to provide the semantic compo-
nent of the communicative content of the constitutional text, but different
versions of original differ with respect to contextual enrichment and the rele-
vance of expectations about application. Balkin's position on expected applica-
tions is clear: he rejects application beliefs as constitutive of original meaning.
His position on contextual enrichment is less clear; he may limit original mean-
ing to semantic content. Assuming this limitation, it follows that Balkin's
theory adopts a minimalist position (within the range of originalist options)
with respect to the constraint imposed by the richness of the communicative
content of the constitutional text.
Constraint in construction
Theories of interpretation provide constraint at the level of meaning or com-
municative content, but a theory of meaning alone cannot constraint constitu-
tional practice. Meaning is one thing; legal effect is another. Even if the
communicative content of the constitution were sufficiently rich so as to pro-
vide determinate answers to all constitutional questions, a further question
would arise: does the communicative content bind judges, officials, and citizens
when they act? This further question is answered by a theory of constitutional
construction. One element of such a theory is an account of the relationship
between communicative content and legal content or legal effect.
Even living constitutionalists are likely to admit that the original meaning of
the constitutional text should play some role in constitutional practice. For
example, one might believe that claims about original meaning constitute
one legitimate form of constitutional argument, but that there are other
forms, such as arguments from consensus social values or from political mor-
ality. Originalists characteristically endorse the stronger claim that is reflected
in the constraint principle: the original meaning of the constitutional text
should constraint judicial practice. Ordinarily, this means that the claim that
a particular constitutional doctrine is inconsistent with original meaning would
have trumping force-unless defeated, the fact of inconsistency with original
meaning would be sufficient to establish that the doctrine is invalid. Similarly,
the claim that a particular constitutional doctrine is required by original mean-
ing would provide good and sufficient reason to adopt the doctrine.
But there can be different versions of the constraint principle. Constraint
may be a matter of degree, but for ease of exposition consider the following
formulations:
Strict construction-all of the legal content of constitutional doctrine must be derived
from the communicative content of the constitutional text.
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Inclusive consistency-all of the legal content of constitutional doctrine must be con-
sistent with the communicative content of the constitutional text, and all of the
communicative content of the constitutional text must be included in the legal con-
tent of constitutional doctrine.
Strict Construction would require each and every rule of constitutional law to flow
from the text in one of two ways: (i) the text must itself state rule, or (ii) the rule
must be a logical implication of the text alone or of the text and nonlegal facts
about the world. For an adherent of strict construction, all of the work is done by
interpretation and factfinding: there is no construction zone. Inclusive consistency
allows for the elaboration of legal content that goes beyond the communicative
content of the text: for an adherent of inclusive consistency, there may be a con-
stitutional construction zone where judges or other officials build out the con-
stitutional framework (to use Balkin's metaphor).
Three versions of originalist constraint
Originalist theories vary in the degree to which they constrain constitutional
practice. Theoretically, the degrees of constraint derive from the accounts of
interpretation and construction contained in each version of originalism. We
can now illustrate these differences by examining three different versions of
originalism: (i) original methods originalism, (ii) originalist Thayerianism,
and (iii) framework originalism.
Original methods originalism: maximizing communicative content
"Original methods originalism" is the name of view that the original meaning
of the Constitution includes the methods of interpretation that the Framers,
ratifiers, and/or public of the Founding era could, would, or should have ex-
pected to guide constitutional practice. This view is strongly associated with
Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis.26 They write:
mhe focus of originalism should be on how a reasonable person at the time of the
Constitution's adoption would have understand its words and thought they should be
interpreted. The Constitution's provisions were based on commonly accepted mean-
ings and the interpretative rules of the time. Some of the provisions had clear mean-
ings. Others may have seemed ambiguous, but the enactors would have believed that
their future application would be based [on] the interpretive rules accepted at the
time. Thus, their assessment of the meaning and the desirability of the Constitution
would depend on the interpretive rules that they thought would apply. 27
2 Their view is briefly stated in John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as
the Core of Originalism, 24 CoxsT. CohibiENT. 371 (2007) [hereinafter Original Interpetive Irinciples] and elabo-
rated in Original Methods Originalism, supra note 11.
27 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 26 at 374.
30
Construction and Constraint
Notice that McGinnis and Rappaport's formulation of their idea does not
embrace the distinction between interpretation and construction. Instead, there
view is that the enrichment of the semantic content of the constitutional text by
contextual information supplied by the original methods of constitutional in-
terpretation provides sufficient communicative content that suffices to resolve
constitutional controversies. If this is correct, then robust elaboration of legal
content of constitutional doctrine is consistent with the strict construction ver-
sion of the constraint principle.
Originalist Thayerianism: minimizing judicial power
Consider another possible version of originalism, which I will call "originalist
Thayerianism"-a view that is artificially constructed for the purpose of expos-
ition: the view is inspired in part by the constitutional theory of James Thayer,
but it is not Thayer's own view.2 8 This view is defined by two principles of
constitutional construction:
Modified literalism-the legal content of judicially enforceable constitutional doctrine
shall be equivalent to the semantic content of constitutional text enhanced only by the
obvious and uncontested contextual enrichment.
Judicial restraint-Courts may only enforce the legal content derived from the consti-
tutional text by the principle of modified literalism; in cases presenting constitutional
question not resolved by such content, the judicial branch shall defer to the consti-
tutional constructions of the political branches or the states.
Originalist Thayerianism provides a very high degree of constraint for judges,
but allows other officials substantial latitude in constitutional interpretation and
construction. It achieves this constraint in two ways. First, it artificially restricts
contextual enrichment of the literal meaning (semantic content) of the text by
adopting the principle of modified literalism. Second, it requires judges to defer
to the political branches when constitutional meaning is uncertain: when the
modified literal meaning is ambiguous, vague, gappy, or contradictory, judges
must defer to the constitutional constructions of the Executive, Congress, or
the States.
Framework originalism
This brings us to Jack Balkin's theory, framework originalism. Balkin does not
explicitly address the question of contextual enrichment, but what he does say
suggests that constitutional interpretation should focus on the semantic content
of the constitutional text. It also seems clear that Balkin rejects the claim that
contextual enrichment provides sufficient communicative content to provide
substantial constitutional determinacy. Thus, we can assume that Balkin be-
lieves in a substantial construction zone: the framework settles some questions,
28 J~mEs B. THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERiCAN DocTRiNE OF CoNsnTUONAL I Lw (1893).
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but many others will require judges and officials to create legal content to
resolve irreducible ambiguities, vagueness, gaps, and contradictions.
In particular, Balkin believes that the constitutional text contains different
types of semantic content, corresponding to the familiar typology of legal rules,
standards and principles:
Fidelity to the Constitution requires fidelity to the original meaning of the text, and to
the choice of rules, principles, and standards in the text. It requires us to be faithful
both to the principles that are stated in the text and those that we understand to be
presupposed by the text or underlie the text, and it requires us to build out consti-
tutional constructions that best apply the text and its associated rules, standards, and
principles to our current circumstances. We might call this approach to constitutional
interpretation 'the method of text, rule, standard, and principle;' however, as con-
venient shorthand, I call it the method of text and principle.2 9
Principles are particularly important, precisely because they are not rules.
Rather, these are the "open ended" or "open textured" provisions of
the Constitution, "for example, the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom
of speech and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection
of the laws."3 o Once we are in the realm of constitutional principle, we are
in the construction zone. It just is the nature of principles that they are not
rules; they guide the process of construction but they do not determine its
outcome.
So Balkin does not believe that constitutional construction is unconstrained.
The method of text and principle is a modified version of Phillip Bobbitt's view
that the legal content of constitutional doctrine is constructed by a complex
practice of argument that incorporates "text, history, structure, precedent,
ethos, and consequences." 3 ' Unlike Bobbitt, whose account of the modalities
of constitutional argument does not provide a hierarchy or lexical ordering,
Balkin's framework originalism privileges arguments from text: "Interpretations
and constructions may not contradict original meaning; therefore once we
know the original meaning of the text, it trumps any other form of
argument."3 2
We can now step back and compare framework originalism with original
methods originalism and originalist Thayerianism. Framework originalism's
understanding of original meaning is thin or sparse as compared to original
meaning originalism: Balkin believes that key constitutional provisions provide
general and abstract principles and hence that their communicative content
underdetermines the content of constitutional doctrine. Original methods
21 Jack Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. lu. L. REv. 815, 817.
3 d.
31 See Id. at 868; Balkin, supra note I at 341 n. 2 (attributing the tools to Bobbitt); see also PHiUp BoBrrr,
CoNsTrrunoNAL INTERPRETAnoN (1993); PlauP BOBBrrr, CONS1TYTONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982).
32 See Balkin, supra note I at 341-42 n. 2.
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originalism holds that the sparse semantic content of the text can be enriched
contextually by the original methods of constitutional interpretation, and hence
a much richer (and perhaps determinate) content for provisions like the free-
dom of speech and equal protection. In this regard, framework originalism
actually resembles originalist Thayerianism on the interpretation side of the
ledger, but when it comes to constitutional construction, framework original-
ism does not adopt the Thayerian principle of judicial restraint. Framework
originalism licenses robust judicial construction of constitutional doctrines with
respect to at least some constitutional provisions. Both framework originalism
and originalist Thayerianism require extensive construction, but Thayerianism
endorses only one principle of judicial construction-the self-abnegating prin-
ciple of judicial restraint that requires courts to respect constructions by the
political branches of the federal government and the states.
If we compare framework originalism to other members of the originalist
family, then the degree of constraint appears minimal. Balkin's theory allows
for a relatively large construction zone-although the constitutional framework
itself may determine a variety of important constitutional questions, especially
on matters of structure where the constitutional text provides rules (rather than
standards or principles). But if we compare framework originalism to living
constitutionalism, then the comparative degree of constraint looks a bit differ-
ent. At least some versions of living constitutionalism reject the constraint
principle. Bobbitt's theory, for example, allows for the possibility that consti-
tutional arguments based on the nomos (or dominant normative framework)
would outweigh or defeat arguments based on the text and its history. When
framework originalism is compared to theories like Bobbitt's, the degree of
constraint seems relatively high.
Conclusion: how much constraint should
originalists want?
We are now is a position to ask the normative question, does framework ori-
ginalism provide sufficient constraint? Or should originalists demand the
greater degree of constraint provided by original methods originalism or ori-
ginalist Thayerianism? These are complex questions; answers are beyond the
scope of this essay. Nonetheless, we can do something about the considerations
that bear on these questions. From the point of view of originalist theory, the
question of constraint has two dimensions. In the realm of interpretation, the
question of constraint is simply a matter of fact. Relative to our best under-
standings in theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language, there is a
fact of the matter about the communicative content of the constitutional text.
If the communicative content is rich, then it is capable of providing more
constraint-relative to whatever version of the constraint principle applies.
But if the communicative content is sparse, then construction will be
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required-when meaning runs out, something else must do the work for con-
stitutional practice. How rich is the communicative content of the constitu-
tional text? That is a very complex question!
Theories of constitutional construction guide constitutional practice. Such
theories require normative justification of some kind. From the perspective of
originalist constitutional theory, theories of constitutional construction are an-
swerable to the underlying justifications for originalism. For example, some
originalists rely on popular sovereignty theory: the original meaning of the
constitution has normative legitimacy because the Constitution was adopted
by "We the People." For a popular sovereignty theorist, the justification for
constraint is the democratic nature of constitutional politics. Other originalists
rely on rule of law values as the justification for the constraint principle; for
them, the question is what version of the constraint principle best achieves the
rule of law values of predictability, certainty, and stability.
In addition to the normative justifications for originalism itself, institutional
concerns may be relevant. One such concern relates to the institutional capa-
cities and trustworthiness of courts and judges. To the extent that some ori-
ginalists believe that unconstrained judging is dangerous or that courts lack the
institutional capacity to make wise decisions in the process of constitutional
construction, these originalists will favor versions of the constraint principle
that minimize the size of the construction zone.
Jack Balkin's theory, framework originalism, results in a relatively low degree
of constraint (compared to other forms of originalism). His theory of interpret-
ation yields relatively sparse communicative content; his theory of construction
requires fidelity to that content, but allows for relatively robust practices of
construction by both judges and political officials. But compared to some
forms of living constitutionalism, framework originalism looks very con-
strained-judges and officials are required to acknowledge the trumping force
of original meaning. For this reason, framework originalism will appeal to those
who seek a middle ground. For them, Balkin's version of originalism may be
"just right."
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